SUMMARY
This article presents arguments in favor of a humanistic approach to the "mental health" education of the general public. Within the context of a "demythologizing" approach, I propose that conceptual paradigms other than the medical model would be of greater benefit to the public in construing their psychological problems. Research evidence is reviewed which attests to the utility of a more humanistic, psychosocial approach.
Humanistically-oriented professionals (e.g., Adams, 1964; Szasz, 1961 Szasz, , 1970a Szasz, , 1970b Szasz, , 1974 Winthrop, 1964) have deplored the medical paradigm of mental illness without, however, finding effective methods to alter the public's general acceptance of that paradigm. Kelly (1972) (Bentz & Edgerton, 1970; Crocetti & Lemkau, 1963; Crocetti, Spiro, & Siassi, 1971 ; Lemkau & Crocetti, 1962; Meyer, 1964; Rabkin, 1974; Ring & Schein, 1970) . Without attempting to detail the cogent arguments made by critics of the medical model (e.g., Sarbin & Mancuso, 1970 Szasz, 1961 Szasz, , 1970a Szasz, , 1970b Szasz, , 1974 Torrey, 1974) (Ennis, 1972; Ennis & Siegel, 1973;  Holdrige-Crane, Morrison, & Morrison, in press; Szasz, 1965 Szasz, , 1970a , and if they had more alternative conceptual models to consider, such abuses would have been fewer.
Second, acceptance of a medical paradigm may frequently influence the public to assume less direct responsibility for resolving personal problems. To view one's problems as a &dquo;mental illness,&dquo; and to seek out a psychiatrist to treat this &dquo;illness,&dquo; implies that lay people can do little or nothing by themselves to change their condition. Such a perspective may lead to increased dependence on psychiatric professionals and a diminished sense of personal responsibility. One study (Morrison, Bushell, Hanson, & Fentiman, 1977) (Albee, 1975) . It is perhaps not surprising that a substantial number of nonmedical professionals (e.g., clinical psychologists and psychiatric social workers) currently reject many of the major tenets of the medical model (Morrison & Nevid, 1976c; Morrison & Hanson, 1978) .
Of course, some psychiatrists (e.g., Osmond, 1973; Siegler & Osmond, 1974a , 1974b (Morrison, in press) and second, on a psychosocial approach to personal problems, with heavy emphasis on personal construct theory (Kelly, 1955) . The demythologizing approach derives from Szasz and others who emphasize that mental illness is only a &dquo;metaphorical disease&dquo; (e.g., Szasz, 1974) ; that diagnostic procedures and projective tests are of questionable reliability and validity (e.g., Mischel, 1968; Rosenhan, 1973) ; that mental patients are not strange, bizarre, unpredictable and dangerous persons (e.g., Braginsky, Braginsky, & Ring, 1969; Ennis, 1972; Steadman, 1973) The response of the public to this approach has been instructive. Frequently, we receive feedback that it is refreshing to hear such professional honesty from mental health professionals. Perhaps much of the ridicule of &dquo;shrinks&dquo; in the media is justified simply because we have taken ourselves and our role all too seriously. An adult education course which reveals our mistakes, our prejudices, and our limitations can actually do much to restore integrity to our profession. The public has always known that we cannot deliver on some of our more grandiose promises of curing the world's ills. But, people want to hear us admit as much.
REVIEW OF RESEARCH
Research studies convincingly demonstrate that &dquo;demythologizing&dquo; seminars are effective in changing the attitudes toward mental illness of psychiatric staff (Morrison & Becker, 1975) , psychiatric clients (Morrison, 1976; Morrison & Nevid, 1976b) , family caretakers (Morrison & Nevid, 1976a) , college students (Morrison, Cocozza, & Vanderwyst, 1978) , general hospital personnel (Morrison & Brown, 1976) , and the general public (Morrison & Teta, 1977; press). Following a presentation of data in direct opposition to the basic assumptions of a medical paradigm, the participants in those studies responded on a very reliable and predictive attitude measure (Client Attitude Questionnaire, Morrison, 1976) in such a way as to reflect a rejection of a medical approach and an acceptance of a psychosocial, humanistic approach. That such an acceptance of an alternative model was a meaningful and stable one is indicated by evidence that participants could explain why they changed their attitudes (Morrison & Nevid, 1976b) and that such attitudes remained virtually unchanged in follow-up administrations from three to nine months after the seminars (Morrison, 1976; Morrison & Becker, 1975; Morrison & Teta, 1977; Morrison, Cocozza & Vanderwyst, 1978) .
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Of most importance to our argument is evidence that these seminar appear to produce a number of positive changes in seminar participants One study suggests that demythologized psychiatric clients experienc, fewer hospitalizations than do a matched group of similar clients who d< not receive &dquo;demythologizing&dquo; (Morrison, 1976) . Another study (Mor rison, 1977) demonstrates that such seminars can reduce the negative attributions to &dquo;the typical mental patient&dquo; made by psychiatric clients. s tudy by Morrison & Teta (1977) 
